[SGP-0012] - IOTA Network Fund: Proposal to Go All-In IOTA Infrastructure and Growth with Tangle DAO [Phase 2 - Poll]

Simple Summary

This proposal suggests a decisive shift for the Tangle DAO LLC: redirect all remaining assets of Tangle DAO toward a focused, time-limited initiative to accelerate core infrastructure and marketing for IOTA Rebased. Rather than continuing the Tangletreasury grant program, we propose to repurpose all resources for maximum strategic impact, followed by the orderly closure of Tangle DAO and its legal entity after 6 - 8 months.

This is the Phase 2 proposal. Read the original Phase 1 proposal here

This poll will be open for seven days and close on Monday, 18th August, at 12 am CEST.
For this proposal to reach Phase 3, this poll requires to receive 100 supportive votes for the proposal.

Only forum members with Trust Level 1 (basic user) or above are eligible to vote in this poll.

Do you support the proposal: [SGP-0012] - IOTA Network Fund: Proposal to Go All-In IOTA Infrastructure and Growth with Tangle DAO?
  • Yes, I support this proposal.
  • No, I do not support this proposal.
0 voters

Abstract

The IOTA ecosystem recently reached a major technical milestone with the launch of its new MoveVM-based mainnet, IOTA Rebased, in May 2025. Yet, critical components of public infrastructure such as indexers, bridges, oracles, listings, but also public education and marketing about this new IOTA, are still lagging behind. Without these, the ecosystem cannot fully support users, developers, or investors at scale.

Motivation

The Time to Act is Now - IOTA at a Turning Point

The IOTA ecosystem is undergoing its most significant transformation yet: the shift from the legacy Tangle architecture to the modern, MoveVM-based IOTA Rebased network. While first key steps have been completed, vital components that are important for developers and community to thrive remain missing, including bridges, oracles, exchange listings, custodial services, and more.

To compete with mature crypto networks, IOTA must offer a complete and user-friendly infrastructure. Progress must be accelerated.

Infrastructure alone isn’t enough. The advantages of the new IOTA need to be communicated clearly and consistently to a wide audience, both within and beyond the crypto space. Achieving this requires professional, multi-channel marketing over many months, ideally years.

We conclude that significantly more resources, both financial and operational, must be urgently invested into this transformation.

Tangle DAO Must Help Out

Tangle DAO, IOTA’s community treasury, was created following a community vote (“Build vs Burn”) in 2022, and formally launched in October 2023. It was endowed with 54 million IOTA tokens. In its most recent term, 10 million tokens funded the Tangletreasury grant program, supporting small projects by funding their code audits, event attendance, and general, milestone-based startup grants.

Yet over the past year, it became clear that the demand for such small-scale grants in the IOTA ecosystem is lacking. According to Tangle DAO’s latest report:

  • 66 proposals were submitted, 25 were funded

  • $680,000 in grants were disbursed, with $700,000 of the terms budget left unused

  • Overhead costs of ~$250,000 resulted in ~25% operational overhead

These numbers show that the program struggled to attract sufficient high-quality proposals. While recipient feedback was positive, the data suggests that the ecosystem does not currently benefit from a grant program of this kind, possibly due to foundational infrastructure, accessibility and quality-of-life of the network still being underdeveloped.

Additionally, the IOTA Foundation already operates its own IOTA Grants program with similar goals, further reducing the need for a second community grant system. With overlapping mandates and limited demand, continuing the Tangle DAO grant program is no longer the most effective use of resources.

Instead, these resources should directly support IOTA’s critical development and market readiness.

All-in: The IOTA Network Fund

Tangle DAO still holds substantial assets. As of July 2025, it owns:

  • 42 million IOTA tokens ($8.4M at $0.20 per token)

  • ~$700,000 in USDT

  • ~$200,000 in other crypto assets (mainly ETH)

We propose that the Tangletreasury program be discontinued (its latest term already ended in July 2025) and replaced with a new initiative:

  • The IOTA Network Fund

Its goal: Re-allocate all Tangle DAO assets to accelerate infrastructure development, exchange and service listings, marketing, and public education for IOTA Rebased.

All assets, aside from a $100,000 reserve for wind-down costs, will be deployed within six to eight months from the passage of this proposal. Once this period ends, Tangle DAO and its legal wrapper, the nonprofit Tangle DAO LLC registered in the Marshall Islands, will be orderly dissolved.

To oversee this transition, a temporary committee will be elected that is tasked to focused on efficiency and speed of the operation::

  • The committee will consist of 1 lead and 2 co-leads (down from 5), and the names are nominated in a specification session.

  • The Program Lead’s rate will be reduced from $70/hr to $50/hr, matching the reviewers’ rate

Conclusion

  • The IOTA ecosystem has entered a new era, but success is not guaranteed. Without decisive investment in infrastructure and outreach, its technological potential risks going unrealized. This proposal offers a clear, time-bound, and impactful way to change that.

By redirecting the Tangle DAO’s assets toward core infrastructure and marketing, and by winding down the DAO once its mission is complete, we can give IOTA the foundation it needs to succeed.

Let’s ensure the community’s contributions are used where they matter most. Let’s finish strong, by building what IOTA still needs.

Specification

New Tangle DAO Committee

The 2024/25 Tangle DAO committee will be released and a new Tangle Dao committee will be elected to manage the DAO for six to eight months and through its subsequent closure procedures. This committee will consist of established current members of the Tangletreasury with a focus on backgrounds in investment and ecosystem building. This proposal offers these positions to the following individuals:

  • Program Lead: Linus Naumann
  • Co-Leads: Yi-Wei Lin & WiWi

This committee will function as the governing body of Tangle DAO, make decisions, including funding approvals, via 2-out-of-3 majority votes. All Tangle DAO multi-signature wallets likewise will require 2-of-3 signature thresholds from these members.

The Program Lead will serve as the primary signatory and representative of the Tangle DAO LLC. The Co-Leads will assume all responsibilities of the Program Lead during any extended absence (e.g., illness or resignation).

Aside from reducing the committee size from five to three members and appointing two Co-Leads instead of one, the committee will continue to operate under the rules set forth in the Tangle DAO LLC Operating Agreement.

IOTA Infrastructure Fund

All previous Tangle DAO funding programs will be discontinued. Instead, all remaining assets (excluding a $100,000 USDT retainer for dissolution) will be allocated to the newly established initiative “IOTA Infrastructure Fund”.

Purpose:

The IOTA Infrastructure Fund aims to rapidly support the development of essential IOTA infrastructure, services, marketing, and public education. Grant funding may support a wide range of efforts, including but not limited to:

  • Exchange and custodial service listings

  • Bridges, oracles, indexers and other on-chain infrastructure

  • Wallets and other user-facing software

  • Compliance, tax, and reporting tools

  • Network analytic tools and services

  • Marketing campaigns, events and educational initiatives

Funding Process:

Grants will be issued based on clearly defined and verifiable milestones (for example, successful integration of IOTA into a public exchange). Payments may be structured as upfront disbursements, milestone-based installments, or retroactive reimbursements.
Grants can be issued directly to infrastructure providers or to intermediary organizations paying those providers.

**Note:** Existing Tangle DAO grants will remain valid for the duration of the six-to-eight-month term. Grantees may continue to submit milestone deliverables and receive payments during this period. After that, all remaining grants and unfulfilled milestones will be closed.

Contracting:

The Program Lead and both Co-Leads will sign new service provider contracts with Tangle DAO LLC that task them to manage Tangle DAO LLC and the IOTA Infrastructure Fund, as well as the subsequent dissolution of Tangle DAO LLC as described in this proposal. The compensation will be $50 per work hour for all positions, with 40 work hours per week for the Program Lead and 20 work hours per week for each of the Co-Leads. In cases of prolonged absence of the Program Lead a Co-Lead will take over his or her tasks, in which case this Co-Lead likewise will assume 40 work hours per week.

Governance Rules:

The IOTA Infrastructure Fund will not follow the funding processes and restrictions outlined in Exhibit C of the Tangle DAO LLC Operating Agreement. Instead, the elected committee will retain full discretion to approve funding decisions via a 2-of-3 majority vote.

There will be no limit on individual grant sizes. All grants must comply with applicable laws, including those of the Republic of the Marshall Islands and Tangle DAO’s internal AML/CTF policy.

All decisions must be documented in writing and signed by committee members for internal use. DAO wallet activity will remain fully transparent and all used addresses remain publicly disclosed. Individual grant details may remain confidential. A final end-of-life report will be published before the liquidation event summarizing all expenditures of these six months by type and funding amount.

The SMR token holders retain ultimate authority over the Tangle DAO at all times, including funding decisions and committee appointments, via on-chain elections as described in Exhibit B of the Operating Agreement.

Timeframe:

All assets of the IOTA Infrastructure Fund are to be used up for its purpose within 6-8 months of the passing of this proposal. Any leftover assets will be liquidated at the end of the dissolution process of Tangle DAO LLC and transferred to another non-profit organisation following the rules of Marshall Island non-profit DAO law.

Dissolution of Tangle DAO LLC:

After this period, the Tangle DAO will start its orderly dissolution process according to the acts of the Republic of Marshall Islands. This process will be led by the Program Lead, who will act as the company’s representative and primary signatory during the whole process. Tangle DAO will fulfill all its contractual obligations and pay all remaining bills, fees and contracts, etc., until the conclusion of the dissolution process.

At the end of the liquidation process all remaining assets will be sent to the non-profit organisation. This is the final step of Tangle DAOs orderly dissolution.

Update of the Tangle DAO LLC Operating Agreement

In order to reflect the new management structure of Tangle DAO, consisting of one Lead and two Reviewers (both of which act as Co-Leads), instead of the current one Lead and four reviewers, of which one acts as the Co-Lead, the relevant passages in the operating agreement of Tangle DAO LLC will be changed.

The sections to be changed in the operating agreement are:


V.1. Decisions of the Grant Committee.

From:

In relation to ordinary and usual decisions, if a member of the Grant Committee is not present creating an even vote (e.g. 4 members, 2 and 2), then in the instance a voting tie occurs, this would result as an opposition to the vote. For example, if the Program Lead or Co-Lead proposed to hire an accountant, and a reviewer was sick, and the vote became 2 yay, and 2 nay, then the vote would not pass.

To:

In relation to ordinary and usual decisions, if a member of the Grant Committee is not present creating an even vote (e.g. 2 members, 1 and 1), then in the instance a voting tie occurs, this would result as an opposition to the vote. For example, if the Program Lead or Co-Lead proposed to hire an accountant, and a reviewer was sick, and the vote became 1 yay, and 1 nay, then the vote would not pass.


V.3 Multisig

From:

The Company will have a multi-signature Wallet (“Multisig” ”) that will require 3 out of 5 signatures for any operation (like spending funds or adding or removing members to the Multisig).

To:

The Company will have a multi-signature Wallet (“Multisig”) that will require 2 out of 3 signatures for any operation (like spending funds or adding or removing members to the Multisig).


V.4 Members/ Composition of the Grant Commitee:

From:

The Grant Committee is composed of 5 members: a Program Lead and 4 Grant Reviewers.

To:

V.4 Members/ Composition of the Grant Commitee:

The Grant Committee is composed of 3 members: a Program Lead and 2 Grant Reviewers.


V.6 Grant Reviewers.

From:

The 4 Grant Reviewers will process funding requests on a part-time basis.

To:

The 2 Grant Reviewers will process funding requests on a part-time basis.


V.6.3 Grant Reviewers’ contractual relationship and remuneration.

From:

The 4 Grant Reviewers will be contracted by Marshall Island DAO LLC based on a contract of services as contractors or consultants. The 4 Grant Reviewers’ contractual relationship and remuneration will be established and contained in the services contract.

To:

The 2 Grant Reviewers will be contracted by Marshall Island DAO LLC based on a contract of services as contractors or consultants. The 2 Grant Reviewers’ contractual relationship and remuneration will be established and contained in the services contract.


V.7 Co-Lead.

From:

The committee Members will select one of the four Grant Reviewers as the Co-Lead.

To:

Both Grant Reviewers will also act as Co-Leads. The Co-Lead acts on behalf of the Program Lead in cases of sickness, holidays, or leaving.

Implementation

The committee will then take the following steps:

  1. Update of the Tangle DAO LLC Operating Agreement
    The outgoing Program Lead officially updates the Tangle DAO LLC Operating Agreement according to the changes stated under “Specifications”.

  2. Service Agreements
    New service contracts will be signed between each newly elected committee member and Tangle DAO LLC:

  • Contracts will be countersigned by the Program Lead.
  • The Program Lead’s contract will be countersigned by one Co-Lead.
  1. Handover Process
    The new committee will assume control of all existing documentation, login credentials, wallets and other company materials from the outgoing committee within 2 weeks.

  2. Release of the outgoing committee
    At the end of the handover process the newly contracted Program Lead documents the official end of the outgoing Tangle DAO committee members work and responsibilities in the company.

Proposal Name, question and answers, and optionally additional information

Proposal Name:
[SGP - 0012] IOTA Network Fund: Proposal to Go All-In IOTA Infrastructure and Growth with Tangle DAO

Question:
Do you support the Proposal [SGP - 0012] - IOTA Network Fund: Proposal to Go All-In IOTA Infrastructure and Growth with Tangle DAO?

Answer 1
Yes - I support this proposal

Answer 2
No - I do not support this proposal

Participation event of this proposal:

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5 Likes

My Response to SGP‑0012, and why I can not support it

I want to share my perspective on SGP‑0012, a proposal calling for the dissolution of Tangle DAO and the reallocation of its treasury under a new committee and mandate.

How the Proposal Was Handled

The proposal was published by one member of the current committee without prior discussion or approval from the rest of us. It lists our Program Lead as its primary signatory, but he was not involved in drafting or reviewing the proposal before it was made public.

The two members named as Co-Leads have been involved during the term, with somewhat more engagement over the past couple of months. However, they were not among the most active members of the committee and did not participate meaningfully in the work on the new operating agreement we have been drafting, nor did they raise concerns or contribute feedback as that work progressed.

This proposal appeared while the rest of the committee was finalising a separate plan to manage a structured transition for the DAO, based on six months of active governance, financial, and strategic work (delayed due to illness in the team).

What the Proposal Actually Does

If passed, this proposal would:

  • Replace the DAO’s governance structure with a private 2-of-3 multisig
  • Eliminate elections and the open grant proposal process
  • Remove public oversight and committee accountability
  • Spend the remaining treasury over the next 6 to 8 months
  • Dissolve the DAO entirely at the end of that period
  • Send any remaining funds to an unnamed non-profit

It includes no new governance document, no transparency standards, no conflict resolution pathways, and no protections for community participation. It removes the core operating structure of the DAO without providing a legitimate replacement.

We Were Already Engaged

The proposal presents infrastructure funding as an urgent new priority. In reality, we were already engaging with the IOTA Foundation and others on this very topic. Specifically:

  • We had indicated our willingness to support one urgent infrastructure grant for 200,000 USD
  • We clarified that under the current operating agreement, only 30 percent could be paid upfront, with the remainder contingent on the continuation of the DAO
  • We expressed preliminary support for up to 250,000 USD in additional grants, to be properly reviewed after the new operating agreement was adopted and our term extended to manage the transition
  • We made clear that we could not ethically approve multiple large grants in the final days of our term while operating under interim conditions

This was not inaction or resistance. It was a deliberate effort to ensure that infrastructure funding progressed within a transparent and accountable process, supported by community agreement.

What We Were Proposing

While this new proposal was prepared behind the scenes, we were finalising a different path forward. Our proposal was nearly complete and included:

  • Publishing a new, more flexible operating agreement we have been developing since 2024
  • Migrating the DAO from Shimmer to IOTA, reflecting where the funds originated and where the community voted
  • Extending the committee by three to six months to oversee the transition and support strategic planning
  • Launching new governance tooling on IOTA Rebased, using a Move-based voting system already scoped with a third-party developer through a public RFP
  • Running new elections under the improved structure once the tooling is in place

During the extension period, we planned to review the remaining infrastructure proposals according to the rules of the new operating agreement and exhibits. We were not refusing to fund infrastructure. We were working to ensure that funding decisions followed due process.

On Activity and Spending

The proposal criticises the DAO for inactivity, citing the number of proposals submitted versus funded. But that framing ignores the full context of this past year.

The DAO term began in July 2024. At that point, some committee members were informed (under NDA) that the entire IOTA protocol would be rebased to a new technical foundation. This was not announced publicly until November 2024, and the new network only launched in May 2025.

During the intervening months, most teams in the ecosystem continued to build on Stardust-based IOTA and Shimmer, unaware that those technologies were being deprecated. Many incoming grant proposals targeted this soon-to-be-obsolete stack. We were often forced to reject or leave those proposals idle, not because they lacked merit, but because we could not responsibly fund work that would not be supported long-term. At the same time, we were legally restricted from explaining the full reasons to applicants or the public.

Even after the public announcement, clarity about the new stack only emerged gradually. Many ecosystem participants only understood what the new Move-based direction entailed in the final months leading up to the network’s launch.

This was not inefficiency. It was the result of a deep transition that reshaped the technical foundations of the ecosystem and placed the DAO in a holding pattern while the new landscape took form.

Despite that, the DAO continued operating responsibly. We improved internal tools, engaged new applicants, funded what we could, advanced governance planning, and ended the term with a net surplus (even after OpEx) and a new proposal nearly ready for publication.

Treasury Management and OpEx

The proposal references overhead and operational spending, suggesting that too much was spent on salaries. In reality:

  • Committee compensation remained below 20 percent of the original budget
  • Our internal policy allowed for up to 30 percent, which we remained well within
  • We offset all of our operating expenses through DeFi yield strategies
  • DeFi earnings exceeded operational costs by more than 85,000 USD

These results show financial discipline and strategic planning. Our work paid for itself.

Legal and Governance Context

Tangle DAO LLC is a single entity with two funding streams. The DAO originally included a committee elected by Shimmer holders and later expanded to include an IOTA-elected committee managing the IOTA portion of the funds.

The IOTA Treasury is now managed by this IOTA committee. However, SGP‑0012 proposes using a Shimmer-only vote to approve reallocation of all funds including those from IOTA.

This presents a governance problem. The IOTA funds were approved by an IOTA community vote, yet that community cannot currently vote due to IOTA Rebased removing governance functionality. Using only Shimmer votes to override decisions about IOTA-elected funds is not consistent with the original community mandate.

That is why we have been working to:

  • Migrate governance from Shimmer to IOTA
  • Extend the DAO under improved operating rules
  • Build new tooling to allow IOTA community voting to resume
  • Respect the structure that was set in place by past votes

Until that infrastructure is ready, attempting to push through irreversible changes with only a subset of the community involved risks damaging the ecosystems legitimacy.

Transparency and Integrity

SGP‑0012 suggests removing the governance exhibit from the operating agreement and granting full spending power to a 2-of-3 vote among a new committee. It removes limits on grant sizes. It includes no published governance document, no election pathway, no conflict resolution framework, and no clarity on member accountability. It does not include proper onboarding or public review for the new leadership structure. It removes key protections with no equivalent replacement.

This is not a transition. It is a power transfer, with minimal oversight, executed at speed. The fact that it was published without informing the full committee or waiting for the finalised proposal undermines the values this DAO is meant to represent.

The Role of a Community Treasury

The proposal argues that because the current grant program faced structural challenges, the DAO itself is no longer needed. I strongly disagree.

The past year has not shown that a community treasury is unnecessary. It has shown that a community treasury cannot succeed when major protocol shifts occur without public warning, when foundational infrastructure is moved behind closed doors, and when grant-makers are legally barred from explaining why entire categories of proposals must be declined.

This was not normal market disinterest. It was the result of external conditions that will not be repeated. Now that the Move-based direction is public and stabilising, community tooling and grassroots builders will matter more than ever.

Infrastructure should absolutely be funded. But that is already the core responsibility of the IOTA Foundation and affiliated organisations, who hold significantly larger war chests and direct ties to engineering, research, and commercial stakeholders. A DAO should not become a passthrough to pay pre-signed deals negotiated by others. It should remain an independent engine for open experimentation, diverse perspectives, and community-aligned priorities.

The DAO exists not to duplicate the Foundation, but to complement it, and sometimes, to challenge it. That is what makes ecosystems resilient.

We have heard before that we just need a few more months of spending to reach a turning point. But spending the full treasury now to do so, without public oversight, without elections, and without structural reform, is short-sighted. With our new governance framework nearly ready, the DAO could be shaped into something much more powerful and participatory over the next several years. That includes new capabilities beyond passive grants, such as accelerators, funding seasons, and global engagement initiatives. It would be a mistake to give up just before we unlock that potential.

Final Thoughts

Any DAO member can publish a proposal. That is how this system works. But how one does so matters. It reveals their respect for the process, for the other contributors, and for the broader community.

I am not opposed to funding infrastructure. I am not opposed to collaborating with the IOTA Foundation or any other entity. I believe it is essential that we do.

But I believe it must happen transparently, using trusted processes, and in a way that honours the DAO’s original purpose.

We will proceed with our proposal to:

  • Transition the DAO to IOTA
  • Extend the current committee to support that transition
  • Fund the development of governance tools so that IOTA token holders can once again vote on their DAO
  • Review all grant proposals properly and publicly under the updated operating framework

If the community supports this, we can restore proper governance, launch new elections, and define the DAO’s next phase together.

This is not resistance to change. It is an insistence that change be handled with care, with legitimacy, and with community support.

6 Likes

Addressing Concerns on the Proposed Committee Members’ Expertise in Strategic Decision-Making for Marketing, Listings, and Overall Strategy

As a community member considering SGP-0012, I have reservations about the nominated committee members - Linus Naumann (Program Lead), Yi-Wei Lin, and WiWi (Co-Leads) - particularly regarding their ability to drive the strategic direction of future decisions under the IOTA Network Fund. The proposal emphasizes rapid allocation of ~$9.3M in assets toward critical areas like exchange listings, marketing campaigns, bridges/oracles, and public education for IOTA Rebased. While these individuals have solid ties to the IOTA ecosystem, their backgrounds raise questions about whether they possess the breadth of experience needed for high-stakes, outward-facing strategies in a fast-paced crypto market. Below, I outline my concerns based on publicly available information, focusing on marketing prowess, listings expertise, and strategic alignment. (Note: Verified details on Yi-Wei Lin and WiWi/Ping Chang Yu align with official sources, confirming Yi-Wei as a Shimmer Treasury reviewer with four years in venture capital specializing in early-stage crypto/tech startups, and WiWi as an IOTA Treasury reviewer passionate about dApp/bot development and DeFi’s revolutionary potential in finance.)

1. Linus Naumann (Program Lead)

  • Strengths in IOTA Context: Linus has deep involvement in IOTA, serving as a former Grant Reviewer and Co-Lead in the Tangle Treasury, and as an IOTA ambassador. He has written extensively on IOTA’s ecosystem evolution, including DAOs, multi-asset features, and growth initiatives. Recent posts highlight his role in the IOTA Growth Initiative, which includes “IOTA Awareness” pillars like marketing and on-chain incentives. He has also discussed strategies for DeFi liquidity, staking, and even innovative pricing models (e.g., fixed USD listings for music rights to reduce volatility).

  • Concerns for Strategic Direction: His expertise is heavily IOTA-centric, with limited evidence of broader marketing campaigns or exchange listings experience outside the ecosystem. While he advocates for marketing in growth contexts, there’s no clear track record in executing large-scale, multi-channel strategies (e.g., global PR, influencer partnerships, or SEO/SEM for crypto adoption). In a market where competitors like Solana have surged via aggressive listings and viral marketing, Linus’s internal focus might not suffice for “professional, multi-channel marketing over many months” as the proposal envisions.

2. Yi-Wei Lin (Co-Lead)

  • Strengths in Venture Capital and Strategy: Yi-Wei brings venture capital experience as an Investment Analyst at Openspace Ventures, focusing on early-stage crypto investments via their Ocular web3 fund. His role involves investment research, knowledge management, and execution in Southeast Asia’s crypto space, which could inform strategic funding decisions for infrastructure like bridges and oracles. This aligns with the proposal’s milestone-based grants and could help in evaluating listings or partnerships.

  • Concerns for Marketing and Listings: There’s scant evidence of hands-on marketing or listings expertise - his profile emphasizes equity analysis and asset management, not campaign strategy or exchange negotiations. No public posts or articles link him directly to crypto marketing tactics (e.g., community building, content virality) or successful listings on major exchanges. In a volatile market requiring agile, data-driven strategies to compete with top networks, his VC lens might prioritize investments over the creative, outreach-heavy aspects of “public education and marketing” needed to bridge IOTA’s current lag.

3. WiWi (Co-Lead)

  • Strengths in Technical Review: As a 2024 Grant Reviewer for the Tangle Treasury, WiWi has experience in evaluating proposals, with a background in Electrical Engineering and practical knowledge in DeFi, yield farming, DEXs, and NFTs. This could support technical decisions on on-chain infrastructure, aligning with the fund’s goals for tools like indexers and wallets.

  • Concerns for Broader Strategy: Visibility is low - likely a pseudonym - with minimal public footprint beyond the grant application (stating age over 21 and part-time availability). No documented experience in marketing, exchange listings, or high-level strategy emerges from searches. This raises doubts about their capacity to guide “marketing campaigns, events, and educational initiatives” or negotiate listings, especially in a 2-of-3 voting system where strategic foresight is crucial to avoid suboptimal allocations.

Additional Concern: Lack of Community Election and Disrespect to DAO Principles

Beyond expertise, the proposal’s process itself is troubling: There was no community election for these nominees; they were handpicked and appointed via the proposal without broader input or voting, shifting to a closed 2-of-3 multisig governance. Moreover, the proposal was published by one current committee member without prior discussion or approval from the full team, listing the Program Lead as a signatory despite his non-involvement in drafting or reviewing it. This disrespects core DAO norms of transparency, decentralization, and community-driven decision-making - DAOs should foster open elections, consensus-building, and accountability, not rushed, top-down changes that eliminate ongoing participation and oversight.

Overall Assessment and Recommendations

While the nominees are competent IOTA insiders with relevant ecosystem-building and investment backgrounds, their collective expertise appears skewed toward internal operations and technical review rather than the outward, strategic imperatives of the proposal - such as robust marketing to “communicate advantages clearly and consistently” or securing “exchange and custodial service listings” to compete with mature networks. In IOTA’s current position (far from ATH, outside top 10, amid rapid market shifts), these decisions could make or break adoption, yet the team’s limited track record in global marketing strategies or listings negotiations risks inefficient spending or missed opportunities. Combined with the undemocratic process, this undermines trust in the DAO’s future.

To mitigate this, I suggest amending the proposal to include:

  • External Advisors: Mandate collaboration with proven marketing firms or listing experts (e.g., those with experience in Solana’s or TON’s growth campaigns).

  • Transparency Measures: Require public disclosure of strategic plans for marketing/listings and periodic community input before major disbursements.

  • Diverse Committee Expansion: Add members with explicit marketing or business development credentials to balance the group’s IOTA focus, selected via a community election.

These additions would better ensure the fund’s resources drive maximum impact without relying solely on the nominees’ strengths. I’d appreciate community feedback on this before voting.

7 Likes